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THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 
IN THE ORIGINAL POSITION* 
Margarita Levin 
Much has been written about John Rawls' A Theory 
of Justice. One of its most distinctive features is 
the "original position" in which principles of justice 
are chosen. In this paper I discuss the formulation of 
the orj-ginal position and, in particular, the conditions 
of knowledge that Rawls puts on it. I will also discuss 
the relationship between the original position and what 
I shall call the "entry condition." I will argue that 
it is very difficult, if not impossible, to satisfy all 
of Rawls 1 requirements for the original position. I end 
with a discussion of changes that could be made in the 
system and the effects they would have. 
Before getting down to details, I will sketch 
briefly that part of Rawls 1 theory which bears on the 
issues discussed in this paper, JRawls labels his 
theory "justice as fairness." By this he means that 
his principles of justice are those that would be 
chosen by "free and rational persons concerned to 
further their own interests . . . in an initial posi-
tion of equality as defining the fundamental terms of 
their association" (p. 11). The initial position of 
equality that Rawls specifies:—the "original position" 
— i s Rawls' device for capturing our intuitions about 
the conditions under which principles of justice 
should be chosen. Rawls stresses that the original 
position should be "interpreted so that one can at 
any time adopt its perspective" (p. 139). Because 
the particular requirement comes up so often, I 
will refer to it as the "entry condition." We shall 
see below that adherence to the entry condition poses 
considerable problems for Rawls. 
There are, furthermore, certain formal con-
straints on the conception of justice that HawIs finds 
intuitively "natural enough" (p. 131). 2 The first is 
that principles be general, that they not contain 
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proper names or definite descriptions. Second, 
" Ipjrinciples must be universal in application" 
(p. 132). Principles must also be public'; they must 
be known by all, not. just implicitly followed. They 
must be competent to adjudicate conflicting claims. 
Finally, there can be no appeal beyond these prin-
ciples. 
The chief characteristic of the original position, 
however, is the limited knowledge of the parties 
involved. They are supposed to know general facts 
about economics, psychology and sociology, but no 
specific facts about themselves. They do nbt know 
their own status, their talents and liabilities, 
their sex, race, physique or anything else. This 
"veil of ignorance" is intended to ensure that the 
people in the original position--henceforth "the 
participants"--do not choose principles that are 
specially tailored to their particular circumstances. 
For instance, if a participant knew he were white, 
he might opt for principles that would permit the 
enslavement of Blacks. The absence of personal 
information ensures that every level of society gets 
a fair deal, since the participants realize that when 
the veil is lifted they may find that they belong to 
the lowest level. • (One might see a certain overlap 
between the first constraint and the information gap: 
both.rule.out principles partial to individuals.) 
Rawls claims that the particular circumstances 
of the original position will lead the participants 
to choose certain definite principles of justice. 
The first, the greatest equal liberty principle, is 
that everyone is to have äs much liberty' as is com-
patible with everyone else's having the same amount 
of liberty. The second principle, the one the veil of 
ignorance is designed to elicit, comes in two parts. 
First of all, there is to be fair equality of 
opportunity—everyone is to have a fair chance at 
positions of power and prestige. This is intended 
to neutralize the disadvantages that one's family or 
social position (or abilities bestowed by the "natural 
lottery") may create. The second clause is known as 
the difference principle: "social and economic in-
equalities are to be to the greatest benefit of the 
least advantaged" (p. 302). If the participants 
adopt this principle, then even if they turn out to 
be among the least advantaged in their society they 
will take comfort in the thought that any other 
arrangement of inequalities would have left them worse 
off. Rawls argues that the choice of the difference 
principle will be the result of the participants' 
using the »naximin strategy for choice under conditions 
of uncertainty: choose from among a set of alternatives 
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The original position plays a crucial role in Rawls' 
theory. Its purpose is to "make vivid to ourselves the 
restrictions it seems reasonable to impose on arguments 
for principles of justice, and therefore on these prin-
ciples" (p. 18). Rawls intends to show that our intuition 
about the rules that should guide the choice of principles 
do agree with the set-up of the original position, and 
that his principles of justice are the ones that the 
participants whould choose. Given that result, he then 
argues that since these are the principles we would 
choose if we were in the original position, these are 
the principles we should in fact adopt. This is an argu-
ment from "hypothetical consent." Rawls intends his 
situation to be analogous to the Kantian one of a purely 
rational being autonomously legislating for himself. 
Just as Kant argues that we should follow those rules a 
rational being would choose, so Rawls argues that we 
should adopt those principles the participants would 
choose. While Rawls never, to my knowledge, explicitly 
characterizes.his argument in this way, some such tacit 
assumption must be at work. If not, the moral signifi-
cance of what the participants would do becomes obscure.-* 
Clearly, then, if Kawls* argument is to persuade us, the 
original position must perform as advertised. It must 
be possible for us to imagine the situation with the 
entry condition, simultaneously fulfilled—the knowledge 
conditions must not prevent our adopting the perspective 
of the original position. 
There are two possible interpretations of the 
"entry condition." The weaker one is that it simply 
require the original position to be a coherent concept, 
that it be possible for us to imagine the original 
position set up and to see that the principles of 
justice do indeed follow from it. On this reading, 
the requirement that we be able to "at any time adopt 
its perspective" just means that we should be able to 
understand what is going on there. But this is surely 
the one whose worst outcome is the best it can be. 
Rawls argues at great length that the maximin strategy 
is the -appropriate one for the participants to use be-
hind the veil of ignorance. 
I will not discuss whether maximin is indicated 
under the circumstances, nor whether its use will 
indeed lead to Rawls' two principles. The coherence 
of the original position is logically prior to these 
issues; if it proves unworkable these other problems 
lose their interest. 
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a rather unlikely reading. It goes without saying 
that the original position should be coherent and 
understandable. This is a requirement every theory 
must meet. Rawls would not pay such special attention 
to this requirement were that all he meant. Therefore, 
the stronger reading must be the correct one, namely 
that we must be able to imagine ourselves entering the 
original position now. In practical terms, that 
amounts to our arguing for principles of justice just 
on the basis of the information that would be available 
to us if we were in the original position. 
What I have called the entry, condition ie not to 
be confused with what Rawls calls the "present time of 
entry interpretation." This, judging from where it 
appears (in sections dealing with saving for future 
generations), is the stipulation that the participants 
are all contemporaries, and that they know this. That 
is, the participants are not to be thought of as coming 
from different centuries: "Since the persons in the 
original position know that they, are contemporaries 
(taking the present time of entry interpretation) . . 
(p. 'IMP). Because they know they all belong to the 
same time, the participants need make no provision 
for saving. It must be stipulated that future genera-
tions are to be considered to prevent the participants 
from choosing principles that are in.tuitively unjust. 
Ill 
Since the original positipn is_ nothing but the 
restrictions and requirements on knowledge it imposes, 
it is these conditions that must be examined. First 
let us recall the information hidden from the partici-
pants by the veil of ignorance: 
[NJo one knows his place in society, his class 
position or social status; nor does he know his 
fortune in the distribution of natural assets 
and abilities, his intelligence and strength, 
and the like. Nor, again, does anyone know his 
conception of the good, the particulars of 
his rational plan of life, or even the special 
features of his psychology such as his aversion 
to risk or liability to optimism or pessimism. 
More than this, . . . the parties do not know 
the particular circumstances of their own 
society. (p. 137) 
The veil does not shut out all information, however. 
The participants " . . . know the general facts about 
human society. They understand political affairs and 
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the principles of economic theory; they know the basis 
of social organization and the laws of human psychology" 
(p. 137). The only personal information they have is 
that they have "some rational plan of life" (p. 1M2) 
but they have no idea what their particular ends or 
interests may be. 
To begin with, these restrictions certainly 
strike one as peculiar. As Rawls remarks: "Surely, 
some may object, principles should be chosen in the 
light of all knowledge available" (p. 139). It seems 
irrational to deny information to the decision makers. 
But Rawls would say that all the relevant information 
is available. The participants are only denied that 
information that might tempt them to choose principles 
that favor them. To some extent, this denial may be 
unnecessary because, as noted, the formal constraints 
on the concept of justice already rule out many types 
of tailor-made principles. For instance, there seems 
to be no reason why the participants should not know 
their own names. The generality requirement by itself 
ensures that a participant could not argue for a 
principle that uses his own name. 
A further, and critical, defect is that Rawls is 
unclear about whether the participants lack those 
properties' hidden by the veil or whether the partici-. 
pants are merely ignorant of possessing them. The 
former interpretation is unlikely. Under it, the 
participants are only stick figures with little 
resemblance to us and of less interest. The argument 
from hypothetical consent draws its strength from the 
claim that we can imagine ourselves in the original 
position and agree that we would reach the same 
conclusion as the participants. Compare discussions 
of the motives and actions of fictional characters. 
When we ask what Hamlet would have done in a certain 
situation, we are thinking of him as ijf he were a human 
being with all the traits human beings have. We could 
not speculate about him if we assumed him to be only 
the sum total of the words and actions assigned to 
him by Shakespeare. Similarly, if the participants' 
decisions are to influence us in any way we must think 
of them as more than just disembodied voices that 
decide on principles. We must think of them as people 
with bodies, talents, fears, ambitions, etc.: the latter 
interpretation is the one Rawls needs. The need to 
satisfy the entry condition is a parallel reason for 
the participants actually to possess the properties in 
question. Since we must be able to adopt the perspec-
tive of the original position, and we_ certainly have 
these properties, the most that can be required of the 
participants is that they forget they have these 
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properties. 
But this admission undermines Rawls' derivation of 
his principles, because ignorance of a trait does not 
prevent its operation. Most people do not know how 
shy or optimistic or agile they are, yet these traits 
shape their beliefs and behavior. The gambler at the 
race track does not know his "aversion to risk," yet 
his attitude influences the bet he makes. (Someone 
might object that "reason and emotion are distinct." 
This is undeniable; but it is also obvious that these 
two faculties influence each other. This latter point 
is all the present argument requires.) The example of 
the gambler is particularly relevant to Rawls theory, 
since the participants are supposed to use the maximin 
strategy which in turn leads them to choose the Rawlsian 
principles of justice. As I said earlier, I wj.ll not 
go into the details of Rawls' argument for maximin. I 
merely want to point out that Rawls says his principles 
"are those a person would choose for the design of a 
society in which his enemy is to assign him his 
place . . . " (p. 152). True, he goes on to say that 
"the (participantsJ do not, of course, assume that 
their initial place in society is decided by a malevolent 
opponent. . . . (T]hat.the two principles of justice 
would be chosen if the parties were forced to protect 
themselves against such a contingency explains the 
sense in which this conception is the maximin solution" 
(p. 153). In effect, Rawls claims that the participants 
will not, in the absence of all pertinent information, 
assign the same probability to all possible outcomes 
and act accordingly; rather, they will use the strategy 
prescribed for those with infinite aversion to risk. 
Yet he continues to emphasize that because of the veil 
of ignorance "the parties do not know whether or not 
they have a characteristic aversion to taking chances" 
(p. 172). My point is that whether they know it or not 
is irrelevant--they have the attitudes toward taking 
chances they do, and (if they are enough like us to 
represent us) no constraints on their knowledge will 
prevent their attitudes from influencing them. That 
Rawls thinks that forbidding the participants to have 
knowledge of their own traits is enough to secure im-
partiality indicates the very confusion I have cited--
that between knowledge of one's personality and the 
effect of one's personality on one's decisions. To 
remedy the situation Rawls would have to claim or 
argue that our traits do not influence our thinking--
a claim which is, to say the least, counterintuitive. 
It might be objected that the participants' 
characteristic attitudes are not supposed to enter 
into the arguments for the principles of justice. The 
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entry condition amounts to saying that we cannot 
appeal in our arguments to specific information about 
individuals; our arguments are supposed to keep to 
general facts about society. This might remedy the 
situation if the derivation of the principles of 
justice were fully rigorous. However, Rawls appeals 
to intuition so frequently in his account of what the 
participants would do that he opens the door for many 
non-deductive types of reasoning. This is especially 
true in the case of something as deep-seated as one's 
attitude toward risk. What one person will see as a 
quite reasonable chance to take, given the high pay-
off, another will view as foolish gambling. All the 
veil of ignorance rules out are arguments beginning 
"Because I am so timid, I think , , . ." 
A broader issue raised by the distinction between 
having a trait and knowing that one has it is the 
question of how much we are influenced by our sex, 
race, age, strength, health and the like. These are 
all items the veil of ignorance hides from the par-
ticipants and, because of the entry condition, from us_ 
— y e t such items influence our attitudes and behavior 
for better or worse. To most, the fact of this influence 
will seem obvious. Those who disagree must at least 
grant that Rawls would have to argue that this is not 
so. The very absence of any discussion of this issue 
is indeed further evidence that Rawls confuses not 
knowing about a trait with not having it. The traits 
in question are pertinent because Rawls says that the 
participants must not be unrealistic idealists who 
choose principles that are impossible to abide by: 
"they will not enter into agreements they know they 
cannot keep, or can do so only with great difficulty 
. . . along with other considerations they count the 
strains of commitment" (p. I'l5). That is, they must 
bear in mind how heavy will be the burden, and how 
much such personality traits as envy, sloth and greed 
may affect one's commitment to a particular system of 
rules. It is not enough to assure us that once the 
correct principles are in effect these character 
traits will disappear. That sounds too much like the 
Marxist who airily asserts that, come the revolution, 
greed and ambition will disappear. In light of this, 
Rawls might say that the participants know enough 
general facts about psychology to be able to predict 
which principles will be difficult to abide by and 
which will not. But psychological theories must take 
into account the differences among people. Given any 
social scheme there will always be some people who find 
it difficult to fit in, to abide by its rules. So, at 
least, it has always been. The participants may not 
know whether they are among the misfits or not, but 
they may instinctively feel an aversion to certain 
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principles. 
Before turning to the problems raised by the re-
quirements on knowledge, I want to make one last point 
about the restrictions. The restrictions are in force 
to ensure that every type of person in a society will 
be considered when the principles of justice are being 
chosen. Since a participant is unaware of his race, 
sex, age and wealth, he must bear in mind what effect 
the principles will have on him no matter what he 
turns out to be. Rawls hopes to cover every sort of 
person this way, but he fails to cover them all 
equally. As Hare remarks, "it is rather hard to see 
how the veil of ignorance could conceal from one of 
the contracting parties the fact that he is a babe in 
arms."'' Rawls writes as if it were possible for the 
participants to think that they might be children (see 
pp. 2>»8-i»9). But this is impossible. The participants 
know psychology and they are rational, so they can 
draw the neo-Cartesian inference: I reason, therefore 
I am adult (or, at least, not a young child). If 
Rawls will not permit them even such inferences as 
this, the participants' status as our representatives 
is again threatened. In any event, Rawls is incon-
sistent: his efforts to block the formation of co-
alitions (see, e.g. p. 110) indicates that he does 
expect the participants to use their wits. 
Just because children cannot be participants does 
not mean their rights will go unconsidered. The 
participants should certainly take into account the 
fact that they might turn out to be parents and care 
very much what happens to their children. But this 
concern cannot carry as much force as the concern for 
oneself and the situations one might turn out to be in. 
Rawls, we saw, invokes the requirement that the par-
ticipants care about their descendants' welfare and 
what those descendants think of their decision (see 
p. 155). But even if this seemingly arbitrary re-
quirement is imposed, it is clear that they cannot 
care for their descendants as much as they care for 
themselves, especially since they realize that they 
may not have any descendants. So Rawls' knowledge 
conditions do not ensure the rights of children to 
the same degree as they are supposed to ensure the 
rights of all sorts of adults.^ 
Rawls might respond to this by saying that at this 
stage he need not deal with every specific contingency. 
The principles of justice are very broad-, the partici-
pants do not have to resolve every social problem 
before they can decide on principles. More specific 
rules will appear at a later stage in the development 
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of justice, at a time when they are framing laws 
rather than picking general principles. Rawls would 
be entitled to this reply if he himself had not 
already introduced so many specifics into the know-
ledge conditions For the original position, lie denies 
a participant knowledge of his own strength, etc., so 
that he will abjure principles that favor any one 
group. Rawls therefore invites the question of whether, 
despite his precautions, any particular group will fail 
to receive equal consideration. Children form one such 
group because the participants must know they are adults. 
IV 
Thus far I have stressed the difficulties that stem 
from Rawls* knowledge restrictions in the original 
position. There are also problems arising from his 
rather strong requirements. The participants are 
supposed to know the "general facts about human society" 
(p. 137) about politics, economic theory, and "human 
psychology." This is rather-a tall order even for the 
hypothetical original position. It seems particularly 
curious when the entry condition is considered along 
with it. "It must make no difference when one takes up 
this viewpoint, or who does so . . . the veil of 
ignorance is a key condition in meeting this require-
ment. It insures not only that the information avail-
able is relevant, but that it is at all times the .same" 
(p. 139). The requirements on pp. 137 and 139 conflict. 
No one will be able to enter the original position if 
all sorts of abstract knowledge is required. While it 
may be possible at least in theory for the participants 
to suppress their knowledge of certain personal facts, 
it is a different matter to insist that they be 
furnished with a particular theory of society, its rules 
and its members. Even if we grant Rawls the claim 
that his views on economics, psychology and the rest 
are correct, there remains the problem of how these 
facts are to be given to the participants. And the 
entry condition requires that each of us_ be able to 
"adopt the perspective" of the participants, who are 
now made to be more knowledgeable than you or I. It 
is one thing to say that we can forget or ignore certain 
facts; it is quite another to say that we suddenly 
know facts we did not know before. We can convincing-
ly pretend to be dumber or weaker than we are, but we 
cannot convincingly pretend to be smarter or stronger. 
Indeed, when we examine Rawls' argument more 
closely, we see that the knowledge requirements do no 
work at all in the derivation. Of course, we have 
the intuition that accurate accounts of politics, 
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economics, and psychology would be desirable in 
choosing principles of justice. But since Rawl3 
does not possess such an account, he cannot claim 
that possessing them would lead the participants 
to choose his principles. Indeed, our psychology 
may turn out to be such that the strains of commit-
ment to Rawls 1 principles are too much to handle. 
At any rate, Rawls cannot now prove that this is 
not so; he cannot argue on the basis of informa-
tion he (and we) do not have. The knowledge re-
quirements serve merely as impressive window dressing. 
Rawls might respond to all this by saying that 
he is not requiring that the participants know the 
truth about economics and the rest, but just that 
they use the best available theory. This is a much 
more reasonable demand, but it leaves Rawls with the 
problem of what happens with people from different 
centuries. People from the 18th century will have 
views on society that differ from those of people 
from the 20th or 2 2nd century. Even people from 
the same century might honestly disagree about, say, 
whether behaviorism or Freudianism offers the best . 
approach to the human personality. And surely 
Rawls does not want 18th century justice as fair-
ness to lead to different principles than does 20th 
century justice as fairness. 
The knowledge conditions Rawls places on the 
original position make it unworkable. On the one 
hand participants are required to know facts they 
cannot know; on the other hand they are told to 
forget traits that will make their presence felt 
even if forgotten. Part of the trouble, we have 
seen, stems from the entry condition. It might be 
thought that some of these problems would disappear 
if the argument from hypothetical consent could 
somehow be retained without the entry condition. 
However, the entry condition cannot be eliminated. 
The following passages show that, for Rawls, the. 
entry condition is paramount: 
To say that a certain conception of justice 
would be chosen in the original position 
is equivalent to saying that rational 
deliberation satisfying certain conditions 
and restrictions would reach a certain 
conclusion. If necessary, the argument 
to this result could be set out more for-
mally. I shall however speak throughout 
in terms of the notion of the original 
position, (p. 13 8) 
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In any case, it is important that the 
original position be interpreted so that 
one can at any time adopt its perspective, 
(p. 139) 
The entry condition thus emerges not as a side issue 
but as the whole issue. The original position is 
intended to be a sort of shorthand symbol that stands 
for the entry condition. To suggest that the latter 
should be eliminated is to concede that Rawls 1 whole 
apparatus is unworkable. 
V 
The only way to salvage Rawls' system, then, 
is to alter the knowledge conditions. One altera-
tion is suggested by the already-noted overlap of 
the formal constraints on the concept of justice 
and the veil of ignorance. Because these constraints 
forbid the choice of many tailor-made principles, we 
may lift the veil for such items as names, finger-
prints and memories. Many controversial issues 
emerge here. Among them is the fact that a definite 
description can be recast as an indefinite description 
that happens to pick out one individual; another is 
the question of whether, say, the "maleness" of a 
particular man is uniquely his or just an instance 
of maleness indistinguishable from any other instance. 
A decision on these issues is not called for here. 
The point is that the situation is far more complicated 
that Rawls realizes. 
A second alteration is this. Bias threatens 
because the participants are legislating for the 
society in which they themselves will live. This 
threat might vanish if the participants thought 
that they were legislating for others who were just-
like them in matters of psychology and distribution 
of talents. Let the participants believe that they 
are legislating for future human generations, but not 
for the one they live in now. In either case, the 
question of what the participants themselves get out 
of the principles they choose will not arise, at 
least directly. The participants' bias can be cir-
cumvented. It might be objected that even though 
they will not be personally affected, the partici-
pants will still tend to favor their sex or race or 
whatever group they belong to. However, even if 
they do have such a tendency it will be weaker than 
their bias toward their own positions. Another 
possible objection is that people choosing principles 
for others will not be as concerned as they would 
be if they were choosing for themselves. We shall 
have to assume that the participants meet in good 
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faith and that they choose principles carefully and 
conscientiously. But this is not too much to ask, 
since it is no more than Rawls assumed in the original 
position. 
A more serious objection is that the shift to 
this altered original position weakens the argument 
from hypothetical consent. It now becomes a question 
of our adopting principles that we would pick for 
others rather than for ourselves. But this threat is 
not all that serious: on the assumption lately 
broached that the participants are acting in good 
faith, the participants would be willing to abide 
by the principles they selected. This even has the 
advantage of shoring up a weakness of the old origi-
nal position: because of the veil of ignorance, the 
non-participant who is asked to adopt the principles 
of justice could say "If I had known then what I know 
now about myself, I would not have picked those 
principles." Hie participant in the new original 
position cannot say this. He is actually more apt 
to accept the principles he has chosen than is a 
participant in Rawls 1 original position. Once again, 
we find the knowledge restrictions causing trouble. 
Their elimination makes the hypothetical consent 
argument easier to take. 
But while this shift to a more plausible original 
position strengthens Rawls' method, it has serious 
consequences for Rawls' theory. It seems unlikely 
that participants in the new original position will 
use the maximin strategy, a crucial premise in Rawls' 
"derivation" of his second principle of justice. 
Since the participants are no longer completely in 
the dark, they will probably employ some other 
strategy to guide their choice. Certainly they no 
longer have any reason to act as if they were in-
finitely averse to risk. Nor is this an accidental 
consequence of the altered original position I have 
sketched. The veil must be lifted if the entry 
condition is to be satisfiable, and as soon as it is 
lifted so is some element of potential risk. 
Where does all this leave Rawls' system? The 
entry condition turned out to be the raison d'etre 
of the original position. Since the knowledge con-
ditions on the original position collide with the 
entry conditions, the former must be modified. One 
can make the veil of ignorance unnecessary by having 
the participants choose for others. This shift makes 
the hypothetical consent argument more plausible, 
but may lead to the rejection of maximin as the 
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strategy to guide the choice of principles. So in 
order to salvage the original position we must jettison 
those aspects of the theory—the knowledge conditions 
and their resulting strategy—that lead to Rawls' 
principles. The new original position may well lead 
to distinctly non^Rawlsian principles. To paraphrase 
a well-known explanation, we have to destroy the 
theory in order to save it. 
University of Minnesota 
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See section 23, "The Formal Constraints of the 
Concept of Right." 
3 
For an interesting discussion of hypothetical 
consent, see Michael Slote, "Desert, Consent, and 
Justice," Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1973. 
l,R.M. Hare, "Rawls' Theory of Justice," in Norman 
Daniels, ed., Reading Rawls (Basic Books: N.Y., 1975). 
^Whether the participants will consider that they 
might become childlike through mental deterioration is 
a quite different matter. Degeneration may arise later, 
and anyway is not the norm. On the other hand, the 
participants know they are not young children. They 
may gamble that they will not become senile or brain-
damaged; they know that at present they are competent 
adults. Of course, since Rawls assumes that the 
participants are infinitely averse to risk, he might 
argue that they would take the possibility of mental 
deterioration quite seriously. On the other hand, 
since it is normal to grow old, the participants will 
not choose principles that lead to mistreatment of 
old people—unless they are willing to gamble on a 
short life and a merry one. 
